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Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can
Customary International Law Be Improved?
Although customary international law (CIL) has historically been one of
the principal forms of international law, it is plagued by debates and
uncertainties about its proper sources, its content, its usefulness, and its
normative attractiveness.1 While some of these debates and uncertainties are
longstanding, they have intensified in recent years, in part because of the rise of
multilateral treaty-making, which allows nations collectively to negotiate and
codify broad areas of international law instead of relying on unwritten custom.
Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that CIL is structurally unable
to address many of the world’s most pressing problems, such as (to name a
few) nuclear proliferation, global warming, and international financial
stability. Perhaps most fundamentally, there “is no coherent or agreed upon
theory to justify [CIL’s] role or explain its doctrine.”2 For these and other
reasons, CIL is “under attack from all sides.”3
In light of the current state of CIL, it is worth thinking creatively about
how to improve this body of international law. One difference between the way
that many treaties are structured and the way that CIL is structured concerns
withdrawal rights. The conventional wisdom among international law scholars
is that, once a rule of CIL becomes established, no nation has the legal right to
withdraw from the rule. Instead, if a nation wants to change a rule of CIL,
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See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
66 U CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1117-18 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 123-31 (2005); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000).
Guzman, supra note 1, at 117.
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either it must convince other nations to enter into a treaty overriding the rule,
or it must violate the rule and hope that other nations will acquiesce to the
violation. This regime applies even to nations that enter the international
system after a CIL rule is formed. In a recent article, Withdrawing from
International Custom, we referred to this conventional wisdom as the
“Mandatory View” of CIL.4
In contrast to the Mandatory View, many treaties, even those that address
fundamental issues of international public policy, expressly allow for unilateral
withdrawal, sometimes conditioned on a notice period.5 In addition, other
treaties are thought to allow for withdrawal by implication—as a function, for
example, of their subject matter. Furthermore, even when a treaty does not
expressly or implicitly allow for withdrawal, a nation may have the legal right
to terminate the treaty as a result of developments such as a material breach of
the treaty by another party or a fundamental change of circumstances. We
suggested in Withdrawing that the contrast between the extensive and variable
exit rights under treaties and the purported lack of any exit rights under CIL
was puzzling and deserved study, especially given the overlap that exists today
between the content of treaties and of CIL and the frequent reference to treaties
as evidence of CIL.6
We then turned in Withdrawing to a consideration of history. The
Mandatory View, we explained, was not always the canonical understanding of
CIL. Some of the classic publicists on international law, such as Emmerich de
Vattel, thought that nations had the legal right to withdraw from some rules of
international custom, a proposition that we referred to as the “Default View” of
CIL.7 Also, a number of the U.S. Supreme Court’s early international law
decisions assumed such a Default View.8 We attempted to discern when the
intellectual shift to the Mandatory View occurred, and we suggested that the
shift—at least in the international law treatises—may have taken place most
sharply in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9 We also found
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indications that the shift may have been related in part to efforts to bind new
states to customary rules that had been established by Western powers.10
We did not argue that this history dictated any particular conclusions about
how CIL should operate today. Instead, we noted that it “shows that the
Mandatory View is not the only possible approach to CIL, and that an
international legal system could potentially operate despite the allowance of
some CIL withdrawal rights.”11 The remainder of Withdrawing was dedicated
to an examination of the functional desirability of the Mandatory View. We
found little explanation for the Mandatory View in the literature and thus were
compelled to speculate about its justifications. Drawing upon scholarship in
the areas of contract theory, corporate law, voting rights, and constitutional
design, we concluded that reasonable arguments could be made for disallowing
exit with respect to those areas of CIL that address significant interstate
externalities or agency problems but that it was difficult to justify a
disallowance of opt-out rights across the board for all of CIL.12
Finally, we suggested that allowing for withdrawal rights under CIL could
help revitalize this body of international law.13 Withdrawal rights would make
it easier for states to innovate in addressing modern problems because the
additional flexibility provided by such rights would lower the cost of creating
new rules of CIL as well as the cost of pushing for alterations to existing rules.
In addition, the invocation of withdrawal rights would help provide
information to the international system about the position of nations on both
the content of particular CIL rules and their level of commitment to them.
Furthermore, providing a lawful avenue for exiting from CIL rules in the face
of changed circumstances would increase the likelihood of collective
enforcement of such rules against states that have not exercised the right of
withdrawal since the line between breach and exit would be more sharply
delineated.
Withdrawing challenges conventional wisdom, so it is not surprising that it
has generated strong reactions. The scholars who have written responses in
The Yale Law Journal Online—Lea Brilmayer, Bill Dodge, David Luban, Isaias
Tesfalidet, and Carlos Vázquez—critique our analysis on a number of grounds.
In this Essay, we attempt to address these criticisms, while also highlighting
areas of research that might help move the debate forward. Throughout the
Essay, we emphasize a recurring theme, which is the need to improve and
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revitalize CIL. Before proceeding, we want to express our gratitude to the
respondents for engaging with our project and to The Yale Law Journal for
facilitating this dialogue.14
In Part I, we discuss the endorsement of the Default View by some of the
classic international law publicists, including Vattel. In Part II, we consider the
shift in the international law treatises to a Mandatory View of CIL and the
potential connections between that shift and colonialism. In Part III, we revisit
the modern disparity in withdrawal rights between treaties and CIL. Finally, in
Part IV, we address a number of functional considerations that are relevant in
choosing between the Default and Mandatory Views.
i. vattel and the shift away from the default view
In Withdrawing, we explained that a number of the classic international law
publicists, such as Vattel, thought that nations could unilaterally withdraw
from some rules of CIL. We also explained that this Default View was reflected
in some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s early and most famous international law
decisions, such as Ware v. Hylton and Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.15 Bill
Dodge and David Luban acknowledge this history but point out, as we did in
Withdrawing, that Vattel and other publicists still thought that many rules of
CIL, most notably rules based on natural law, were mandatory.16 Somewhat
confusingly, Vattel labeled these rules based on natural law the “voluntary law
of nations” to distinguish them from those rules that were subject to unilateral
withdrawal, which he named the “customary law of nations.”17
It is worth pausing to note the significance of this agreement between the
respondents and ourselves. In discussing CIL and its history, not one modern
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casebook or treatise acknowledges that there was ever a Default View.
Moreover, scholars who have otherwise relied on early publicists such as Vattel
seem to be unaware of the publicists’ endorsements of the Default View. In
addition, debates in foreign relations law scholarship often depend on
understandings of the early Supreme Court cases, and yet no one in those
debates has realized that some of these decisions assumed a Default View.
While agreeing with our basic claim about the history, Dodge contends
that the scope of what Vattel thought was encompassed by the Default View
was relatively insignificant. For Vattel, says Dodge, the voluntary law of
nations (which was mandatory) “completely overshadowed” the customary law
of nations, which was “merely interstitial.”18 Dodge’s position is not necessarily
inconsistent with what we wrote in Withdrawing, since we made no claims
there about the scope of the Default View, in Vattel’s writing or otherwise. In
any event, a close reading of Vattel’s treatise suggests that his understanding of
the role of the Default View was more robust than what Dodge describes.
In categorizing international law, one of Vattel’s postulates was that
nations generally have freedom of action, so long as they do not interfere with
the “perfect rights” of other nations. Thus, said Vattel, “[a] Nation is therefore
free to act as it pleases, so far as its acts do not affect the perfect rights of
another Nation, and so far as the Nation is under merely internal obligations
without any perfect external obligation.”19 Perfect rights, in Vattel’s view,
concerned certain fundamental matters, such as territorial sovereignty, freedom
of navigation on the high seas, and the ability to conduct diplomatic relations.
The breach of these rights provided a just cause for war.20 Many rights under
international law, however, were imperfect, and they were still considered
binding.21 Moreover, Vattel said that “care must be taken not to extend [perfect
rights] so as to prejudice the liberty of Nations.”22
It was against this backdrop that Vattel describes what he means by the
customary law of nations. He explains that this body of law consists of “rules

18.
19.
20.

Dodge, supra note 16, at 173-74.
VATTEL, supra note 17, intro., § 20, at 7.
See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009). Violations of perfect rights provided a legal justification for
war, whereas violations of imperfect rights did not. See VATTEL, supra note 17, intro., § 20, at
7; id. bk. III, § 26, at 243-44.
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See, e.g., H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (photo. reprint 2000) (1861) (“[A] right
is no less a right because it belongs to the class called imperfect in international law; so of a
duty, it is none the less obligatory because it is imperfect, and cannot be enforced under the
rules of international jurisprudence.”).

22.

VATTEL, supra note 17, intro., § 23, at 8.
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and customs, consecrated by long usage and observed by Nations as a sort of
law” and that it “is founded upon a tacit consent, or rather upon a tacit
agreement of the Nations which observe it.”23 Such a customary rule was
binding on nations “so long as they have not expressly declared their
unwillingness to follow it any longer.”24 Although Vattel noted that this
category of international law encompasses customs that “are indifferent in
nature,”25 by “indifferent” Vattel did not mean that the custom was
insignificant. Rather, he meant that the custom was not “unjust or unlawful.”26
Importantly, Vattel makes clear that he is not attempting in his treatise to
catalogue the various customary rules and instead limits himself to “stating the
general theory of it.”27 As it turns out, in a number of places in his treatise he
does refer to particular rules as falling within the customary category. For
example, he treats a nation’s obligation to allow enemy citizens to leave its
territory upon declaring war as a customary obligation, explaining that this
obligation exists because the enemy citizens came into the territory “in reliance
upon the public faith; for in permitting them to enter his territory and to reside
there the sovereign impliedly promised them full liberty and security for their
return home.”28 Similarly, he treats consular immunity as falling within the
customary law of nations.29 In addition, Vattel often describes particular areas
of international law as involving a mixture of the voluntary law of nations and
the customary law of nations.30 Furthermore, even when classifying something
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as falling within the voluntary law of nations, Vattel often falls back on
reasoning grounded in tacit consent rather than on natural law. He does so, for
example, when discussing ambassadorial immunity.31
Vattel also returns to his general theory of the customary law of nations in
the portion of his treatise that discusses the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors and other public ministers. He explains that if a nation:
happens to find at a later time that the custom is disadvantageous, it is
free to declare that it is unwilling to abide by such a custom; and once it
has clearly made known its intention there is no room for complaint on
the part of others if it does not observe the custom.32
He makes clear here that this Default View applies “not only in matters relating
to ministers, but also in other matters in general.”33
In sum, while not the principal focus of his treatise, there is no indication
that Vattel viewed the customary law of nations as insignificant in the way that
Dodge suggests. Nor did other classic publicists who endorsed the Default
View, such as Burlamaqui, Bynkershoek, or Martens, view it as insignificant.34
Moreover, as Dodge acknowledges,35 Vattel’s endorsement of the Default View

31.
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33.

Vattel explains that “it is impossible to believe that it is the intention of the prince who
sends an ambassador, or any other minister, to subject him to the authority of a foreign
power.” Id., bk. IV, § 92, at 376. As a result, he reasons that:
If it can not be reasonably presumed that the sovereign of the minister would
consent to subject him to the authority of the sovereign to whom he is sent, the
latter, in receiving the minister, consents to receive him upon that footing of
independence; and this constitutes between the two princes a tacit convention
which gives a new force to the natural obligation.
Id.
Id., bk. IV, § 106, at 385-86.
Id., bk. IV, § 106, at 385 (emphasis added).
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See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 217. Luban contends that Burlamaqui thought that
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was influential in both international law commentary in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as well as in early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.36
Dodge also takes issue with our suggestion that the intellectual shift to the
Mandatory View may have occurred most sharply in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. He contends, rather, that the Mandatory View
developed “not at the turn of the twentieth century, but during the middle of
the nineteenth.”37 The precise timing of the shift, while of obvious historical
interest, is not particularly material for our project. Our main point was that,
unbeknownst to most modern commentators, there was once a Default View
for some rules of CIL. In any event, the evidence that Dodge advances in
support of his mid-nineteenth century temporal claim is thin. He notes that
some commentators as early as the mid-1800s, most notably the British
publicist Richard Wildman, had a more mandatory conception of CIL than did
Vattel, but he does not dispute that other important treatises continued to
support the Default View throughout the remainder of the nineteenth
century.38 Although Dodge suggests that Henry Halleck’s 1861 treatise adopted
the Mandatory View,39 in fact Halleck relied on Vattel’s framework, including
the right to opt out of some rules of CIL, and this reliance continued up
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through the 1908 edition of Halleck’s treatise.40 In addition, as we discussed in
Withdrawing, the “voluntarist” school of international law, which was
influential at least up until World War II, was in substantial tension with the
Mandatory View. And there were continuing challenges to the Mandatory
View even in the post-World War II period (from developing countries and the
Soviet bloc, in particular).41 Dodge does not address, let alone contest, these
points.
Dodge does respond to one twentieth century development that we
discussed—the shift from an absolute approach to sovereign immunity to a
restrictive approach whereby nations have immunity in foreign courts only for
their public, sovereign acts and not their private, commercial acts. As noted in
Withdrawing, nations shifted away from the absolute approach without being
viewed as violators of CIL, and without the need for a treaty, suggesting that
the Default View may have continued to operate in practice for some areas of
CIL even in the twentieth century.42
Dodge attempts to explain this development by contending that sovereign
immunity is merely a matter of nonbinding comity rather than CIL.43 In
support of that proposition, he cites language from several decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court that link immunity with comity.44 However, while the
Court has sometimes stated that sovereign immunity “is a matter of grace and
comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the
Constitution,”45 it has never denied that immunity also implicates principles of
international law. For example, it has described as one of the major purposes of
the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) the codification of
international law,46 and it has looked to international law and practice both in

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See 1 HALLECK’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-56 (G. Sherston Baker ed., 4th ed. 1908); Bradley &
Gulati, supra note 4, at 219 & n.65. Halleck does appear to have had a narrower conception
of the Default View than publicists like Wheaton, but that does not mean that he abandoned
the Default View altogether.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 228-29, 231-32.
See id. at 232.
Dodge, supra note 16, at 188-89.
See id.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010) (“[O]ne of the primary purposes
of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which Congress
recognized as consistent with extant international law.”); Permanent Mission of India to the
United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007) (referring to “two wellrecognized and related purposes of the FSIA: adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign
immunity and codification of international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment”).
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construing the Act and in filling in its gaps.47 Even long before the Act, U.S.
courts understood that sovereign immunity was governed by international
law.48 This has also been the position of the Executive Branch.49 Other nations,
as well as influential commentators, also understand sovereign immunity as
governed by international law.50
Dodge’s dispute with us about the timing of the shift to the Mandatory
View is related to his attempt to explain the shift to the Mandatory View as
resulting from the rise of positivism in international legal theory.51 This causal
claim, however, is insufficiently supported. At most, Dodge is able to show a
temporal correlation between the rise of positivism and the shift to the
Mandatory View. Correlation, however, is not causation. In addition to the
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5, intro. note (1987) (“The immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
state is an undisputed principle of customary international law.”); ANTHONY AUST,
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2005) (“State immunity is a doctrine of customary
international law.”); HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 13 (2d ed. 2008) (“That
immunity is a rule of law is generally acknowledged by States.”). Other types of immunity,
such as head of state immunity, are also understood by the international community to be
governed by CIL. The International Court of Justice has stated, for example, that “in
international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain
holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government
and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both
civil and criminal.” Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 3, 21-22 (Feb. 14).
See Dodge, supra note 16, at 182-84.
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usual difficulties with making causal historical claims, there are particular
reasons to doubt the causal story here. As Dodge himself argues, the early
arguments for making some CIL rules mandatory were based on natural law,
so it is unclear why a shift away from natural law would lead to the Mandatory
View for all of CIL. Moreover, even if positivist commentators were attempting
to use notions of general communitarian consent to replace what had been
addressed by natural law, as Dodge suggests,52 Dodge does not explain why
they would preclude withdrawal rights even for CIL rules that had not
previously been considered to fall within natural law. It is also worth noting
that the Marshall Court was positivistic in its international law decisions and
yet subscribed to the Default View, not the Mandatory View.53 Finally, it
appears that Vattel contributed to the shift towards positivism in international
legal theory and yet he provided what was probably the most influential
intellectual support for the Default View.54
A final historical dispute between us and the respondents concerns our
suggestion that the famous Paquete Habana decision from 1900 may have been
influenced by the Default View.55 In that case, the Supreme Court, sitting as a
prize court, held that the U.S. Navy was required to pay compensation to the
owners of fishing vessels seized during the Spanish-American War because the
seizure violated CIL. The decision is famous because the Court stated in its
opinion that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”56 It also stated, however, that courts should apply CIL only
“where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision,”57 and this qualification has long puzzled and divided
commentators.

52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.

See id.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 229-30.
See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in NineteenthCentury International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (1999) (“Vattel . . . is a pivotal figure in
this shift towards positivism . . . .”); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts
Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1112-13 (1985) (“[S]ome
later eighteenth-century scholars such as Vattel began to elevate positive law as the basis for
a nation’s duties under international law.”); cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 121 (2005) (“Vattel’s
programme is to create an objective system of law by excluding natural law from it.”).
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 223-25.
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Id.
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In Withdrawing, we suggested that the Court in The Paquete Habana may
have had in mind the Default View of CIL.58 In support of this possibility, we
noted several elements of the decision that we found suggestive: that the Court
emphasized that the United States had continued to accept the CIL rule in
question; that the Court relied heavily on a Marshall Court decision (Brown v.
United States) that had reflected the Default View; that the Court relied on
Henry Wheaton’s international law treatise, which strongly endorsed the
Default View; and that the Court suggested that a unilateral public act by the
U.S. government disavowing the CIL rule would be equivalent to a treaty
exception to the rule.59 We also made clear, however, that we were “not
arguing that this is the only possible reading of the decision—just that it is an
available reading that becomes apparent when one understands the Default
View that was common in the nineteenth century.”60
Nothing set forth in the responses rebuts this possibility. Dodge points out
that the Court in The Paquete Habana refers to the “‘general consent of civilized
nations,’”61 but that language alone seems hardly dispositive, since it does not
preclude the possibility of a withdrawal of consent. Luban makes a better
argument, noting that the Court referred to a controlling “judicial decision”
and that it would be strange from the perspective of separation of powers to
think that “the judiciary has unilateral authority to opt the United States out of
a rule of international law.”62 This proposition becomes less strange, however,
when one considers the context of the case: it was a prize decision, a context in
which the courts traditionally had an especially broad and independent role in
developing the rules of international law.63 More importantly, although Luban
does not explain how he would interpret the Court’s reference to a controlling
“judicial decision,” it appears that he would read it as an endorsement of a
judicial ability to place the United States in breach of international law. It is
unclear, however, why that interpretation would be any less strange from the
perspective of separation of powers. Indeed, the Court has long presumed that
even Congress does not intend to place the United States in breach of
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Luban, supra note 16, at 160.
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international law,64 so there are reasons to doubt that the Court in The Paquete
Habana was asserting a judicial ability to do so.
It bears repeating that the principal goal of our historical analysis in
Withdrawing was to establish that the Mandatory View was not always the
exclusive understanding of how CIL operates. It is heartening to see that the
debate is already moving beyond that issue to address questions relating to the
nature and extent of the Default View and the timing and circumstances of the
shift to the Mandatory View—all questions that could undoubtedly benefit
from additional research. In addition to its intrinsic interest, knowing more
about this history could be useful when considering how best to improve CIL
going forward.
ii. the mandatory view, colonialism, and new states
In Withdrawing, we attempted to trace the intellectual origins of the shift
from the Default View of CIL to the Mandatory View. The Mandatory View is
obviously canonical in modern writings about international law, but these
writings do not explain its current justifications, let alone the reasons for its
original adoption. We considered an explanation based on the rise of legal
positivism, but found that explanation to be problematic, for the reasons
discussed above in Part I. An alternative explanation, which we found more
plausible, is that the Mandatory View developed in part to ensure that nonWestern countries, which were increasingly coming into the “family of
nations” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, would be bound
by the CIL rules that had already been worked out by the Western powers.65
We found support for this explanation in, among other things, some of the key
early treatises that endorsed a Mandatory View (such as in Oppenheim’s
influential 1905 treatise) and in the secondary literature that has explored the
relevant periods.66
The historical record is complicated and difficult to assess, so we were
tentative in our conclusions on this point. We did note, however, that this
explanation seemed generally consistent with other practices by Western
powers during this time period, including coercive and unequal treaty regimes
with non-Western states.67 It also seemed consistent, we explained, with the
post-World War II rise of the persistent objector exception to the Mandatory

64.

See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).

65.

See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 230-31.
See id. at 230.
See id. at 231.

66.
67.
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View, pursuant to which nations can potentially opt out of CIL rules before the
rules develop. Under that exception, new states (such as former colonies) are
not allowed to opt out of preexisting CIL rules, whereas Western powers can
potentially avoid being bound by CIL developed by what was after World War
II a rapidly growing number of non-Western regimes.68
Dodge accuses us of tarring the Mandatory View “with the brush of
imperialism,”69 a connection that he contends is “simply false.”70 The
Mandatory View, Dodge states conclusively, “did not develop as a tool of
imperialism.”71 Dodge’s principal argument is that CIL, as understood in the
nineteenth century, applied only to nations regarded as “civilized” (meaning
generally Western, Christian nations) and that, therefore, a Mandatory View of
CIL would not have involved the application of CIL to “uncivilized” nations.
“Writers from Hall to Westlake to Oppenheim expressly stated,” he observes,
“that Western rules did not bind non-Western nations without their
consent.”72 This proposition, however, is not inconsistent with our analysis,
and it does little to reduce the normative concerns associated with the rise of
the Mandatory View that we articulated in Withdrawing.
As an initial matter, Dodge’s argument here is in tension with his claim
that the mandatory elements of CIL predominated in the first half of the
nineteenth century, and also with his claim that a more general mandatory
conception of CIL was taking hold by the middle of that century. If much of
the world was not viewed during the nineteenth century as being bound by
rules of CIL, then there was no Mandatory View in the universalistic sense that
it is understood today. In any event, Dodge seems to suggest that Western
powers were excluding non-Western powers from CIL out of respect for their
sovereignty. In fact, it is more likely that the exclusion of the non-Western
powers was connected to the colonial and empire-building interests of the
time. As Kal Raustiala has explained, the exclusionary perspective “made it
easy for empire to coexist with Westphalian territoriality and to become a
viable and even valorized form of rule.”73 In particular, this perspective allowed
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the Western powers to act in a relatively unconstrained fashion in taking over
the lands of the uncivilized peoples.74
The writings of the international law commentators that Dodge relies on
tend to support this less attractive narrative. John Westlake explained, for
example, that “the occupation by uncivilised tribes of a tract, of which
according to our habits a small part ought to have sufficed for them, was not
felt to interpose a serious obstacle to the right of the first civilised occupant.”75
Westlake went on to connect this idea of land rights with ideas about racial
superiority:
The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there is land to
cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy,
curiosity to be satisfied. If any fanatical admirer of savage life argued
that the whites ought to be kept out, he would only be driven to the
same conclusion by another route, for a government on the spot would
be necessary to keep them out. Accordingly international law has to
treat such natives as uncivilised.76
Hall and Oppenheim expressed similar positions about the taking of the land
of indigenous peoples.77
There is no conflict between this nineteenth-century distinction between
civilized and uncivilized states and what we suggested in Withdrawing. Our
suggestion was based in part on the work of Antony Anghie, who has pointed
out that, by the end of the nineteenth century, two developments were
occurring that would have contributed to more of a universalization of

74.

75.
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European international law in order to justify the exclusion of non-European entities from
the privileges of an international legal order based on sovereign equality.”).
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-30 (2d ed. 2004); Ruth
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neo-Colonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 903, 937-40 (1997). Along these lines, Martti Koskenniemi explains that the
international lawyers for the Western empires saw the pursuit of the colonial empire as “a
perfectly natural drive; just as ownership was a projection of the owner’s person in the
material world, colonial possession was an aspect of the healthy State’s identity and selfrespect.” MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 109 (2001).
JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1894).
Id. at 142-43.
See WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (1880) (explaining that if a territory
was “unappropriated by a civilised or semi-civilised state” it could be acquired through
“occupation”); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 276 (1905) (explaining that
occupation applied to land that was uninhabited and defining “uninhabited land” to include
land “inhabited by natives whose community is not to be considered as a State”).
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international law.78 First, the Western powers, as a result of their many
conquests in the uncivilized lands, had acquired a great deal of territory.
Squabbles among these Western nations over these territories were in danger
of escalating. Second, one of the methods of conquest had been to enter into
treaties with many of the uncivilized nations. Recognizing those treaties was
somewhat inconsistent with the view that the nations making the treaties were
not covered by international law. To the extent that part of the story of the
development of international law in the early twentieth century was about
ensuring that these often unequal and exploitative treaties would be respected,
one can see why it would be important to shift toward greater inclusion of the
previously uncivilized nations (that had, as a result of the years of conquest,
supposedly become more civilized) while also preventing them from trying to
exit previously developed international law.79
We do not mean to suggest that there was a clean shift towards a more
inclusionary view of the previously uncivilized nations in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, or that the desire of the Western nations to
further their imperial agendas provides the only explanation for greater
universalism in international law. There is evidence, for example, that jurists
from a number of then-peripheral nations such as China and Japan were taking
active steps to obtain greater inclusion within the system. Given the threats of
Western imperial agendas and the unequal treaties that were being imposed,
there were benefits to learning to work within the system.80 Overall, though,
there are strong reasons to believe that, whereas in the mid- to late nineteenth
century it suited the colonial purposes to have the uncivilized nations excluded
from the reach of international law, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries it was beginning to suit those same interests to have the uncivilized
world included. Nothing in Dodge’s analysis shows otherwise.

78.
79.

80.

436

See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
69-82 (2004).
See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of
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Luban similarly challenges the Western powers explanation that we
suggested in Withdrawing. He argues that, even assuming that we are correct in
locating the timing of the shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View
in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, it could not have developed
as part of an effort to bind new states because there were not many new states
coming into the international system at that time.81
This argument misses the thrust of our analysis. Our position is that the
period of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries was one of transition,
during which some nations previously excluded from the ambit of
international law were being allowed in.82 As an illustration of this transition,
consider the difference in identities of the nations participating in the Berlin
Conference of 1885 and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences. At the
Berlin Conference of 1885, fifteen “civilized” powers gathered to divide Africa
amongst themselves.83 In 1899, at the First Hague Peace Conference, where
issues pertaining to arms control and peace were being discussed, there were
twenty-six participants. While they were predominantly European nations,
they also included four Asian nations—China, Japan, Siam, and Persia.84 At the
second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, held to continue the discussions from
the first conference, there were forty-four participants, including the bulk of
the Latin American republics.85 A transition away from the empire model was
occurring, and it is not unreasonable to think that the powers of the time were
seeking to retain control over the system.86
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See Luban, supra note 16, at 161-62.
See, e.g., Anghie, supra note 54, at 36-37.
See William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of
Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 325 (2001) (“The Berlin conference
of 1884, where several European powers . . . sought the orderly partition of Africa,
represents one of the final efforts to maintain the global status quo.”).
See WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1908).
See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 29 (4th ed. 1971) (citing the transition between the two
Hague conferences as part of the move toward universality in international law).
See Kelly, supra note 1, at 510-11 (noting that Vattel’s authority was diminished at the end of
the nineteenth century because of the “emerging social reality of new, non-Western
nations”); see also Aceves, supra note 83, at 325 (“As colonial empires began to recede, new
states entered the international system. International organizations also began to appear.
Despite these developments, the European powers sought to maintain their exclusive grasp
over the international system.”).
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Luban notes that Oppenheim endorsed the Mandatory View as early as
1905.87 Importantly, however, Oppenheim’s 1905 treatise specifically
emphasized that non-Western nations were increasingly coming into the
family of nations. After observing that the Turkish Empire and Japan had
already done so, Oppenheim explained that the status of a variety of other
nations (including a number of Asian states) was currently “doubtful” but that
“[m]any treaties had been concluded with them” and that “[t]hey will certainly
succeed [in coming into the family of nations] in the near future.”88
Oppenheim also made clear that nations admitted into the family of nations
had to accept all of the CIL rules that had already been developed.89
We should reiterate the tentative nature of our historical analysis. The
intellectual and political history of the legal developments of the period that we
are discussing is vast and complex, and we have considered only a small
portion of the secondary literature. What we hope that this debate shows is the
potential value of a more sustained historical examination of the intellectual
origins of the Mandatory View.90 In addition to being of inherent interest, such
an examination would help us better understand the normative underpinnings
of the Mandatory View and thus the extent to which that View is consistent
with contemporary normative commitments.
iii. withdrawal from treaties
In Withdrawing, we drew upon Larry Helfer’s work, which shows that
withdrawal rights are commonly included in treaties in numerous subject areas
of international law, even treaties reflecting important principles of
international public policy.91 We suggested that the contrast between frequent
and variable exit rights under treaties and a purported lack of any exit rights
under CIL deserved further study. The contrast was particularly intriguing, we
argued, in light of the substantial overlap that exists today between the
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See Luban, supra note 16, at 161.
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OPPENHEIM, supra note 77, at 33-34.
Id. at 18.
For a suggestion along these lines, see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 28.
See Helfer, supra note 5; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 279
(2d ed. 2007) (“Most multilateral treaties of unlimited duration will allow a party an
unconditional right to withdraw.”) (emphasis omitted); Barbara Koremenos & Allison Nau,
Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81 (2010) (explaining how the inclusion of
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in such clauses).

89.
90.
91.

438

mandatory versus default rules

substantive content of treaties and CIL and the frequent use of treaties as
evidence of CIL.
Lea Brilmayer and Isaias Tesfalidet take issue with our analysis, contending
that analogizing to treaties “involves a serious distortion of the existing law of
international agreements, which does not in fact grant a right of unilateral
withdrawal.”92 They go on to explain that, although withdrawal rights under
treaties are common, the right “almost always arises because of what both of
the parties agreed to observe,” which means that in this context “[t]he right to
opt out is mutual, not unilateral.”93 In support of this proposition, they cite
and quote from various provisions in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties limiting the circumstances under which a party may unilaterally
withdraw from a treaty when the treaty does not itself provide for a right of
withdrawal.94
This analysis is interesting, but it does not respond to our analysis in
Withdrawing. Our focus there was on whether a complete ban on unilateral exit
from all rules of CIL made good sense from the perspective of institutional
design. State preferences are relevant to that question, but it is difficult to
obtain direct evidence of state preferences regarding withdrawal rights under
CIL because neither the content of CIL nor its secondary rules of operation are
typically the product of express negotiation. In the treaty context, by contrast,
we have concrete evidence of state preferences, as reflected in the agreements
that are made. In that context, we see that nations commonly express a
preference for exit rights, often subject to notice periods and sometimes other
limitations. Moreover, we see that states express this preference in the same
subject areas that are regulated by CIL. This provides some reason to think
that, if states were self-consciously designing a system of CIL, they would not
disallow exit across the board.95
Pointing out that withdrawal rights in treaties are often the product of
agreement is not responsive to this analysis because there is no such process for
expression of preferences built into the structure of CIL. Moreover, while it is
true that the inclusion of withdrawal clauses in treaties is (like the inclusion of
other treaty clauses) a mutual decision, the actual exercise of withdrawal rights
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Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and “Withdrawal” from
Customary International Law: An Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous Consequences, 120 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 217, 217 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/1/5/brilmayer-tesfalidet.html.

93.

Id. at 218.
See id. at 218-21.

94.
95.

Cf. Koremenos & Nau, supra note 91, at 83 (“The process of negotiating treaty provisions is
costly. If we assume that the signatory parties are rational actors, it follows that withdrawal
clauses must be beneficial, or they would not appear in agreements.”).

439

the yale law journal online

1 2 0:4 2 1

2011

under such clauses is not mutual. Instead, these clauses typically allow states to
act unilaterally in deciding whether to exit from a treaty. Nothing in the Vienna
Convention is to the contrary: it merely provides various default rules
concerning the circumstances under which withdrawal is allowed,96 and these
default rules recognize that nations may choose to allow for withdrawal and
that a right of withdrawal can even be implicit in an agreement.97
The existence of widespread, agreed-upon withdrawal rights under treaties
also illustrates other propositions relevant to our discussion in Withdrawing. It
suggests that there is no inherent conflict between allowing for exit and
maintaining an international rule of law, given that exit rights under treaties
are not viewed as presenting such a conflict.98 In addition, it shows that
allowing for a legal right of exit does not necessarily lead to widespread abuse
or an unraveling of international commitments, since, as far as we can tell, this
has not happened in the treaty context.99 Furthermore, the fact that states
commonly agree to provide for a right of unilateral exit illustrates the potential
connection between exit rights and the ex ante decision to create international
obligations in the first place.100 As other commentators have noted, allowing
for exit rights or other escape clauses in treaties arguably facilitates treatymaking by lowering the cost of commitment and providing a form of insurance
that allows states to engage in greater experimentation.101 This invites the
question, which we explored in Withdrawing, of whether exit rights under CIL
might have a similar positive effect.
None of this is to say, however, that the treaty regime and the CIL regime
are perfectly analogous, or that there is a one-to-one relationship between the
choices that states make with respect to treaties and the choices that they would
want to make, if given the opportunity, with respect to CIL.102 Our more
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modest points are simply that the choices made in the treaty context are
relevant when thinking about the proper design of the CIL system and that
these choices provide some reason to question the across-the-board
disallowance of any withdrawal rights under the Mandatory View. As a result,
a consideration of the treaty context can be instructive when thinking about
how best to reform and improve CIL.
iv. functional considerations
Much of Withdrawing was dedicated to considering the functional
advantages and disadvantages of the Mandatory View. We concluded that,
although there were arguments for restricting exit from certain types of CIL, it
was difficult to justify a complete ban on withdrawal from all rules of CIL.103
We also suggested that allowing for some withdrawal rights had the potential
to improve CIL in a variety of ways. Among other things, such rights would
help states better tailor CIL to their specific needs and thus would likely
increase both the production and use of CIL.104 Such tailoring would also have
the potential to increase the overall quality of CIL rules, as well as CIL’s ability
to innovate to address modern problems.105
Each of the respondents engages with our functional analysis. Their
arguments can be grouped into two sets of considerations: first, whether the
Mandatory View already provides nations with sufficient flexibility, and,
second, whether a shift to the Default View would cause states to act in ways
that are harmful to the international system.
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Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 65 (2010) (considering how limitations on exit in
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See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 240-41, 263.
See id. at 250-51.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 26-28. Carlos Vázquez suggests yet another potential
advantage of the Default View: whereas under the current understanding of CIL a relatively
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a CIL rule in the face of such dissent under the Default View. See Carlos M. Vázquez,
Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small Portions, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
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A. Flexibility Under the Mandatory View
Both the Vázquez and Brilmayer & Tesfalidet responses recognize the
importance of allowing nations some flexibility in making international
commitments, but they contend that the current system of CIL already offers
sufficient flexibility.
Vázquez asserts that our proposal of allowing increased withdrawal rights
“differs only modestly” from the Mandatory View as it currently operates.106
To the extent that Vázquez is suggesting that the Mandatory View is not a fully
accurate description of the current system of CIL, we agree, and we suggested
this in Withdrawing.107 At the same time, some of Vázquez’s assertions about
how the status quo currently operates are questionable and require more
verification than what he has provided.
Vázquez contends that, once the limitations we suggested in Withdrawing
are factored in, withdrawal rights under the Default View would apply to “only
a small subset of customary international law.”108 It is unclear how Vázquez
arrived at this quantitative assessment, especially since we know that the list of
treaty rules for which withdrawal is allowed is not a small subset.109
Ultimately, assessing the amount of CIL that would allow for withdrawal
would require the application of a typology to specific areas of CIL, an
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Vázquez, supra note 105, at 369. Consistent with the Annie Hall line in its title, Vázquez’s
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assessment that has not yet been conducted. Our main point in Withdrawing
was simply that the number should not be zero, as maintained by the
Mandatory View.
It is not obvious that the limitations we suggested in Withdrawing would
disallow withdrawal rights for most of CIL. The two most significant
limitations that we suggested were for situations in which the CIL rule
addressed either agency issues or externalities. The first category would most
obviously encompass jus cogens norms, which are viewed as superseding
national decisionmaking, but this is a limited subset of CIL.110 As for CIL rules
implicating externalities, collective action problems have meant that the major
international externality issues have had to be resolved through treaties or
written soft law instruments rather than the evolution of CIL.111 For these
reasons, even if one were to categorize all the laws involving significant agency
and externality issues under the Mandatory View, it seems likely that there
would remain a large body of what one might call traditional CIL.
Vázquez also suggests that the ability of nations to violate CIL rules under
the Mandatory View is similar to the ability of nations to withdraw from CIL
rules under the Default View. He explains that if other nations acquiesce to a
CIL violation under the Mandatory View, the violation will be “retroactively
validated” and will not be considered as a signal of bad behavior.112 As a result,
he argues that CIL is not much stickier under the Mandatory View than it is
under the Default View, except that under the Default View states would “be
able to continue to deviate even if most other states would prefer to retain the
rule.”113
Vázquez’s argument here appears to be premised on the claim that, when
states violate CIL under the Mandatory View, they will acknowledge their
violation and “frame[ it] as a proposal for a change in the law.”114 We find this
prospect unrealistic, and Vázquez provides no examples of it occurring.
Because there is no guarantee that other states will acquiesce to a violation,
states have little incentive under the Mandatory View to be this open about
their position, since they run the risk of being considered a lawbreaker. Under
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These norms may also reflect a natural law approach to international law, in which case
disallowing withdrawal rights for these norms would be consistent with Vattel’s view that
CIL based on natural law should be mandatory. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 264-66.
Vázquez, supra note 105, at 277.
Id. at 278. Here Vázquez appears to be implicitly disagreeing with Luban, who argues that
one of the virtues of the Mandatory View over the Default View is its stickiness. See infra
note 144 and accompanying text.
See Vázquez, supra note 105, at 277.
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the Default View, by contrast, such openness would not create legal liability. As
for the concern that, if withdrawal is allowed, it will mean that states would
“be able to continue to deviate even if most other states would prefer to retain
the rule,”115 something like this is already allowed under the current persistent
objector doctrine, a doctrine that Vázquez purports to accept.
More generally, we question Vázquez’s apparent assumption that the
reputational consequences of a breach of international law are identical to those
associated with a lawful withdrawal. Certainly there does not appear to be such
an equivalence between breach and withdrawal in the treaty context.116 Taken
to an extreme, this equivalence argument would suggest that CIL is not
operating as law, a proposition that we do not believe Vázquez intended to
endorse.117
Unlike Vázquez, Brilmayer and Tesfalidet assume that the Mandatory View
as it is described in the literature is an accurate description of the status quo,
but they contend that this View offers sufficient flexibility. They emphasize in
particular the existence of the persistent objector doctrine, pursuant to which
nations are allowed to opt out of CIL rules before they become established.118
As we have explained elsewhere, a number of limitations on the persistent
objector doctrine substantially reduce its usefulness.119 To invoke the persistent
objector doctrine, a nation must object to an international norm before it
“crystallizes,” yet it is often unclear when such crystallization is occurring.
Moreover, the nation must vocally and repeatedly object to the emerging norm,
which makes the doctrine costly in terms of inter-state friction. Such vocal
protests also carry a risk that the objecting state will inadvertently help
crystallize the norm, since the objections may be seen as an acknowledgment
that the rule is forming. In addition, the persistent objector doctrine is of no
use to a state that develops an interest in the issue only after the CIL rule
develops (or that has its interests or circumstances change such that the rule
becomes more problematic).120 For these and other reasons, the doctrine has
almost never been invoked.
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See Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, at 224-25.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 24-25; see also Lim & Elias, supra note 107, at 148
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intended utility”).
For this reason, Andrew Guzman has argued for the allowance of subsequent objector rights
that can be invoked when a state first develops an interest in the issue. See Guzman, supra
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The structural limitations of the persistent objector doctrine would be
remedied under the Default View. Since nations would have the ability to be
subsequent objectors, they would not need to police the formation of potential
CIL rules around the globe. Nor would there be a requirement of vocal and
repeated objections. A single clear objection would suffice, diminishing the
amount of friction that has to be created. And a nation desiring exit would not
need to be concerned that, by announcing its desire to exit, it was inadvertently
helping to create a rule that it opposed.121
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet acknowledge that the persistent objector doctrine
will not apply once a CIL rule has formed, but they contend that any argument
for subsequent withdrawal rights must be grounded in value judgments about
fairness or sovereignty rather than functional considerations.122 Their argument
is that the addition of subsequent withdrawal rights cannot affect a state’s ex
ante behavior, because the decision whether to withdraw will come up only
after a state decides not to opt out under the persistent objector doctrine. Even
putting aside the various limitations on the persistent objector doctrine that
make it unlikely to be used, their argument assumes that states believe that
their interests will remain static, which seems unlikely. If a state in fact
understands that its interests may change over time, the state is likely to factor
in that need for flexibility when making decisions ex ante, such as whether to
support a CIL rule or join a treaty that might help create CIL.123
B. Effect on International Cooperation
Each of the responses contends that a shift to the Default View would
undermine international cooperation. The purported harms associated with
such a shift involve an increase in complexity and uncertainty in the
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note 1, at 169-71; see also Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 253-54 (discussing Guzman’s
argument).
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 14, at 24.
Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 92, at 226. Brilmayer and Tesfalidet state that we “attach
great importance to ‘sovereignty costs.’” Id. at 229. In fact, we referred to such costs only in
the context of arguing that the Default View might facilitate more multilateral treatymaking by reducing the potential costs of such treaties in terms of state flexibility. See
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 262-63. We do not disagree with Brilmayer and Tesfalidet
that states are sometimes willing to incur sovereignty costs in order to obtain commitments
from other nations; we simply question their apparent assumption that states always favor
commitment over flexibility.
Cf. Koremenos & Nau, supra note 91, at 89 (“States may not even commit themselves to an
agreement if they anticipate circumstances will alter their expected benefits. Certain
flexibility provisions, like duration clauses, can insure states in this context.”).
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international system, increased manipulation of the rules, the creation of gaps
in the law, and excessive withdrawals.
1. Complexity and Uncertainty
After arguing that a shift to the Default View would not differ significantly
from the status quo, Vázquez changes course and contends that such a shift
would “significantly diminish the value of customary international law as a
mechanism for regulating state behavior.”124 He first argues that allowing for
withdrawal from some CIL rules would increase the complexity of CIL. While
he acknowledges that withdrawal rights are common in treaties,125 he contends
that treaty law is better situated to absorb the increased complexity that comes
with allowing for such rights because, unlike CIL, treaty provisions are
typically set forth in an agreed-upon written document.126 By contrast, he says,
the Default View for CIL would “introduc[e] significant indeterminacies and
complexities that would adversely affect the efficacy of its norms.”127
As an initial matter, it is not clear to us how much complexity in a body of
law is too much, and Vázquez does not suggest any metric for making such an
assessment. CIL as currently understood has a variety of secondary rules about
its formation, and none of them is written down. Moreover, a number of these
rules, such as the rules concerning the amount, type, and duration of state
practice that is needed in order to generate a CIL rule, are highly uncertain. In
addition, the secondary rules of CIL have not remained constant. The
development of the persistent objector doctrine, for example, appears to be a
relatively recent phenomenon.128 Moreover, CIL does not currently have just
one exit rule, as Vázquez appears to assume. For example, although states can
use treaties to exit (as between themselves) from most rules of CIL, this is not
true for jus cogens norms. Going in the opposite direction, the development of
regional CIL (also sometimes referred to as “special” CIL) is understood as
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See id. at 285-86.
See id. at 286-87.
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requiring the unanimous consent of the states to which it applies.129
Furthermore, as discussed above, Dodge potentially introduces yet another
category of rules that fall within the “comity” label, in which there may be no
limits on withdrawal. Vázquez does not raise any complaints about the
additional complexity created by having those additional categories.
It is also worth noting that there is nothing preventing the codification of
the secondary rules of CIL, including withdrawal rights, which would
presumably reduce their uncertainty. This is eventually what happened with
the secondary rules of treaty law, which until the modern era were all
addressed through unwritten CIL. In another article, we have described the
kind of research and activities that might produce such a codification, and we
would welcome Vázquez and the other respondents to join us in that project.130
Vázquez is also worried that if withdrawal rights were allowed, CIL “would
degenerate into an unfathomably complex patchwork of essentially bilateral
legal relationships.”131 Such degeneration, however, would depend in part on
the extent of withdrawals. As explained in Withdrawing, there are reasons to
predict that withdrawals would not be extensive under the Default View.132 In
any event, as Vázquez acknowledges, this sort of complexity is common in the
treaty area and is not thought to seriously undermine the value of that body of
international law. While it is true that treaty withdrawals are by definition
public events—a fact that helps clarify the particular interstate relationships—
that would also be true of withdrawals from CIL under the Default View.
Nations would need to announce publicly their prospective withdrawal in
order to avoid a default rule of CIL, so other nations would have full notice,
just as they do for treaty withdrawals.
In fact, the public notice aspect of the Default View would likely increase the
clarity of CIL, and that potential effect would need to be weighed against a
potential increase in complexity. Under the current Mandatory View, nations
typically do not publicly acknowledge that they are deviating from a rule of
CIL. Instead, they argue about the content of CIL or act surreptitiously. To
invoke withdrawal rights under the Default View, by contrast, nations would
need to announce publicly their deviation and describe the CIL rule from
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See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (6th ed. 2008) (“While in the case of a
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which they were exiting. In light of that informational value of the Default
View, it is not clear that the regime that we are suggesting would be
substantially more uncertain or complex than what already exists under
treaties, which not only typically allow for withdrawals but also often permit
reservations that further complicate the web of relationships.
2. Manipulation
Dodge contends that the Mandatory View is justified on the ground that
having an additional category of CIL that allows for withdrawal would add
uncertainty to the system and lead to manipulation.133 He further contends that
although flexibility is desirable in international relations, sufficient flexibility
already exists by virtue of having some international norms fall within a
nonbinding “comity” category rather than within the category of CIL.134
There is tension between Dodge’s defense of the category of comity and his
argument that having additional categories beyond the mandatory category of
CIL poses a risk of manipulation. As our debate with him over the status of
sovereign immunity shows,135 his concern about the uncertainty that can be
generated by multiple categories applies to the current system he is defending.
Perhaps more importantly, his defense of comity reveals that, like us, he
believes that nations should have some ability to exit from at least some
international norms (something that is allowed within the comity category).
The comity category that he defends, however, offers none of the limitations
and protections that could be applied under the Default View of CIL, such as
requirements of prospectivity and advance notice.136
In any event, while it is almost tautologically true that having an additional
category can increase uncertainty and thus the possibility of manipulation, that
argument could be made about any system of law that has some mandatory
rules. Nevertheless, we find that this argument is not considered a persuasive
reason against having nonmandatory rules in other contexts. In corporate and
contract law, for example, where there are both default and mandatory rules,
there are frequent debates about how to categorize particular rules. Despite
decades of robust discussion in the literature over default versus mandatory
rules, however, we are unaware of any serious argument in favor of having the
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see Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 254-75.
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entire system covered by a set of mandatory rules, just so that there can be no
uncertainty about categorization.
Dodge says that “history suggests some reasons to worry” about
manipulation of CIL categories,137 but he does not point to any serious
problems of manipulation arising from the Default View in the nineteenth
century. He refers to Ware v. Hylton, but then acknowledges that the Supreme
Court correctly categorized the CIL rule in that case.138 He contends that the
Court in Schooner Exchange “engaged in its own manipulation” because it
assumed a right of withdrawal for the CIL rule there—immunity for a foreign
state’s warships—whereas under Vattel’s scheme there would not have been a
right of withdrawal.139 In fact, Vattel never addressed the issue of immunity for
warships, and Chief Justice Marshall correctly noted that the Court was
“exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids from precedents or written
law.”140 That is all the history that Dodge musters on this point.
Another problem with the manipulation argument is that the Mandatory
View is itself structured in a way that encourages manipulation. Under that
view, instead of invoking a right of formal exit (as nations do under treaty
regimes), nations dissemble, argue about the content of CIL, and engage in
surreptitious violations.141 It is unclear why that sort of behavior is preferable
to allowing formal exit, which at least provides the system with clear notice of a
nation’s position. As discussed in Withdrawing, in a legal system that is heavily
dependent on reputation and retaliation for its enforcement, as is true for
international law, the availability of such information about the expectations
and behavior of the actors is particularly beneficial.142 A system of formal exit as
opposed to manipulation of extant CIL rules is also more consonant with rule
of law values.143
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text.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 4, at 261-62; see also Samuel Estreicher, A Post-Formation
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3. Possibility of No Law
Luban contends that if nations are allowed to withdraw from rules of CIL,
the result will be no law at all on particular subjects, and he is particularly
concerned that this legal lacuna will emerge with respect to the CIL governing
the laws of war. As a result, he contends that the “stickiness” of CIL—
something that we discussed in Withdrawing—is a virtue. “[T]here are a few
reactionaries among us,” he says, “who think that this particular inefficiency is
a good thing.”144
Although we briefly addressed the issue of gaps in the law in
Withdrawing,145 we were not particularly focused on the laws of war. We did
note, however, that CIL in this area might need updating in light of changes in
the nature of armed conflict.146 This observation has been made by others and
we did not view it as particularly controversial.147 Luban, however, suggests
that, even if CIL governing the laws of war is outdated, allowing for
withdrawal from this CIL will lead to “detainee mistreatment and civilian
casualties.”148
We understand Luban’s concerns, but we think that they are overstated. To
the extent that there are CIL rules governing the treatment of individuals
during armed conflict, these rules presumably developed because they were in
the mutual interest of nations likely to engage in conflict, and this would be
true whether there was a right of withdrawal or not. Relatedly, almost all
nations have ratified the Geneva Conventions, and, even though those
Conventions allow for withdrawal, nations have chosen to stay within the
treaties.149 Luban does not explain why the calculus would be different for CIL.
Luban may have in mind that there are certain norms—for example, the
norm against torture—that should operate without regard to national consent.
For such norms, moral and other considerations might suggest that nations
cannot even enter into treaties altering the norms. There is in fact a category of
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international norms that is said to operate this way—the small category of jus
cogens norms—and this category is generally thought to include a prohibition
on torture. As explained in Withdrawing, there are strong arguments for
treating jus cogens norms as mandatory,150 so in this respect there may be little
disagreement between us and Luban.
As for stickiness, we did not argue in Withdrawing that stickiness is always
a drawback. Instead, we argued that CIL was likely to be sticky even under the
Default View.151 There are a variety of reasons for this, such as network effects,
learning externalities, first-mover problems, and the phenomenon of
bureaucratic entrenchment that Luban himself discusses.152 As a result,
concerns about excessive withdrawals from CIL rules under the Default View
are probably unrealistic.153 If so, then creating additional stickiness through a
complete disallowance of exit is less necessary for deterring harmful behavior
than Luban assumes. Again, however, jus cogens norms may be a sensible
exception.
Luban was a vociferous critic of the Bush Administration’s approach to the
war on terror,154 and it may be that he is worried that CIL withdrawal rights
would legitimize such an approach. Importantly, however, the Bush
Administration’s approach had nothing to do with the Default View of CIL.
Instead, it was based on the claim that much of the laws of war simply did not
apply to a conflict with a worldwide terrorist organization.155 As discussed
above, this sort of argumentation is unfortunately encouraged by the
Mandatory View of CIL. By contrast, to invoke withdrawal rights under the
Default View, a nation would be required to publicly announce that it no
longer accepted the international legal principle in question, something that
the Bush Administration showed no inclination to do with respect to the laws
of war. Indeed, the Administration repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to
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both the international law prohibition on torture and the Geneva Conventions,
while at the same time engaging in the conduct that Luban has criticized.156 In
light of the structural inability of the Mandatory View to address this sort of
problem, it is not clear why Luban is defending the status quo approach to
CIL.
4. Excessive Withdrawals
Under the Mandatory View, violations of CIL are understood to be a
method of altering and improving the existing rules. As a result, violations are
not inherently a sign of bad behavior. Under the Default View, by contrast,
violations are more likely to indicate bad behavior because a violation means
that the nation was unwilling to acknowledge its true position with respect to
the CIL rule in question.157
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet do not disagree with this analysis but are
concerned that we may end up with the reverse problem: if withdrawal is not
an inherent sign of being a bad state, bad states might engage in
withdrawals.158 As we suggested in Withdrawing, however, there are reasons to
believe that bad states will be less willing to invoke withdrawal rights than
good states.159 Among other things, it is likely that good states will be able to
articulate better and more credible explanations for withdrawals and thus avoid
negative reputational effects that might otherwise be associated with
withdrawal. In any event, even if bad states make the effort to mimic good
states in this regard, the result will be that more information gets revealed,
which would have positive effects over the status quo.160
Brilmayer and Tesfalidet also suggest that we are being inconsistent in
claiming that, even under the Default View, there will be reputational
incentives not to withdraw from rules of CIL.161 We do not see the
inconsistency. Brilmayer and Tesfalidet appear to assume that only behavior
that violates a legal norm can generate negative reputational consequences, but
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this is incorrect.162 Most social norms, for example, are not embodied in law,
but their violation can nevertheless have reputational consequences. That
reputation and legality are not perfectly coordinated in international relations is
illustrated by two examples: NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia in the
late 1990s was probably illegal, but it did not undermine NATO’s reputation in
most circles (and may have enhanced it).163 By contrast, North Korea’s
purported withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 may
have been legal, since the treaty expressly allows for withdrawal, but it likely
had a negative effect on North Korea’s (already low) reputation.164
Vázquez makes a related argument, contending that an allowance of
withdrawal rights would reduce the value of CIL to each state because it would
lower the likelihood that other states would remain bound to the rule and that
such rights would therefore reduce state investment in creating CIL.165 As
explained in Withdrawing, there are a number of reasons to believe that
allowing withdrawal rights would not lead to a large number of exits.166 In any
event, while it is essentially a truism that withdrawal rights would make CIL
less prospectively binding, Vázquez does not take account of the additional
flexibility that each state also receives, which in turn makes the CIL rule less
costly and thus potentially more attractive to each state ex ante. Importantly,
we know that when states consider the balance between flexibility and
commitment in the treaty context, they often choose the flexibility of
withdrawal rights, and the ability to make that choice likely facilitates
investments in treaty-making.167 Vázquez does not explain why, for CIL, the
balance always favors commitment over flexibility.
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conclusion
If CIL is to continue operating as a significant body of international law, its
problems must be addressed. While we do not claim that the Default View is a
panacea, allowing for broader withdrawal rights under CIL has the potential to
facilitate innovation in CIL, while also increasing the flow of information and
enhancing CIL’s legitimacy. There may of course be other ways to improve CIL
that we have not considered, and we would be happy to see this debate prompt
additional proposals for reform. We share the instinct of some of our
respondents that a shift to the Default View, to be done effectively, would
likely require a concerted effort from the major players in the international
system along with contributions from academics. Experience with prior efforts
to codify the secondary rules of international law, such as with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, suggests that a project of this nature is
feasible over the long term. In the meantime, this debate has revealed fruitful
areas of research that will help deepen our understanding of both the history
and operation of CIL.
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